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1 Introduction
One of the most striking and seemingly surprising consequences of the recent episode of sovereign
debt market stress in the Eurozone has been the increase in the share of public debt held by the domes-
tic sector in fragile economies (Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012), and Van Riet (2014)). Despite a deep
turmoil period on the public debt market of the peripheral Eurozone countries, residents in GIIPS
countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) significantly increased their purchases of domestic
sovereign debt, both in volume and in proportion. Thus, by mid-2012, the share of sovereign debt
securities held by the domestic sector was above 60% in Italy and above 70% in Spain, beyond the
pre-Euro area levels, in the context of a decline in financial integration in Europe (Raileanu-Szeles and
Albu, 2015). On the contrary, home bias in sovereign debt1 kept decreasing in Germany, moving from
around 65% in 2000 to less than 40% by the end of 2014. The causes and consequences of the increase
in home bias in sovereign debt in fragile economies were given only scarce attention in the literature
on the Euro area sovereign debt crisis. In this paper, we fill this gap by empirically analyzing the role
of domestic shocks on home bias and by providing a stylized model backed by our empirical results
to derive the potential consequences of the increase in home bias in the Euro area.
In contrast to Andritzky (2012)’s interpretation of the recent increase in home bias in the Eurozone
– which emphasizes the role of global factors –, divergent trends among countries sharing a similar
currency and their coincidence with the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis suggest that home bias in pe-
ripheral countries increased following country-specific shocks affecting sovereign debt sustainability.
Brutti and Sauré (2015) highlight that repatriation of assets from foreign to domestic creditors mainly
impacted fragile economies and sovereign debt relative to other assets. Van Riet (2014) provides evi-
dence on Euro area national governments’ attempts to create a captive domestic investor base on the
sovereign bonds market in response to fiscal stress episodes, notably in Ireland, Portugal and Spain.
In most of the fragile economies of the zone, the rise in home bias was indeed driven by decreases in
foreign purchases of domestic public debt simultaneous with increases in domestic purchases. This
supports the idea that in times of sovereign debt stress, incentives to buy domestic sovereign debt
increased (or decreased less) for domestic creditors relative to those of foreign creditors, as argued
by Battistini et al. (2014). In the same line, MacDonald et al. (2015) show more generally that the
1As Acharya et al. (2014), we consider that ’Home bias in government debt is total home sovereign debt as a share of
total sovereign debt’ (p. 54). Our definition may differ from the commonly accepted definition, according to which
home bias is the propensity of investors to make financial investments in their home countries rather than in
foreign markets (home bias in portfolios). For comparability and data availability issues, in most countries, we
measure home bias as the share of domestic holdings of general government debt securities, rather than of total
sovereign debt.
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Eurozone countries were mostly responsive to their own domestic shocks in the recent crisis episode.
In addition, empirical literature documented the importance of self-fulfilling factors for explaining
the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis (De Grauwe and Ji (2013), Bruneau et al. (2014), and Schumacher
(2014)). These papers – relying on empirical applications to sovereign debt crises of the theoretical
literature on second-generation speculative attack models (Obstfeld, 1996) – showed that peripheral
Eurozone economies with relatively good fiscal fundamentals faced strong increases in sovereign
bonds spreads, due to episodes of exogenous distrust in international financial markets.2 These sev-
eral empirical elements provide motivation for investigating the impact of domestic shocks on the
evolution of home bias in sovereign debt and for studying both the impact of fundamentals and ex-
pectations shocks on the dynamics of home bias, as the latter is expected to respond to domestic
probability of default shocks.
Furthermore, while the recent increase in home bias in the Euro area appears to be a consequence
of the sovereign debt crisis, it may also have an impact per se on sovereign debt sustainability. In-
deed, the literature emphasized three distinct mechanisms through which home bias might affect the
probability of default. The first one is that a higher home bias increases the internal cost of default,
as it raises the negative impact of default on the domestic economy (Mengus (2014), and Acharya
et al. (2014)). Indeed, it implies that a higher share of domestic creditors, notably resident banks, are
not repaid on their holdings of domestic sovereign bonds following default. The second one is that
the cost of taxation for the government decreases in the home bias. Gros (2012) argues that domestic
taxpayers are less reluctant to pay taxes for financing sovereign debt when they are holding a higher
share of the debt. Therefore, a higher home bias lowers the political cost of taxation for the govern-
ment. In this view, an increase in home bias in sovereign debt decreases the government’s incentives
to default ceteris paribus. Gennaioli et al. (2014) provide empirical evidence in favor of this stabiliz-
ing effect: they show that the larger the exposure of domestic banks to sovereign bonds, the more
costly the default for the domestic economy through its ex post impact on private credit. However,
the third effect identified in the theoretical literature advocates a destabilizing impact of increased
home bias. Thus, Broner et al. (2014) argue that because of financial frictions, higher purchases of
domestic sovereign debt by the resident sector lead to crowding-out effects by disrupting productive
investment, and thus lowers growth. Nevertheless, this last effect has not yet been empirically tested
in the literature.
2First models of self-fulfilling sovereign debt crises include Calvo (1988) and Cole and Kehoe (2000). This
category of models was recently applied to the Eurozone debt crisis (Lorenzoni and Werning (2013), Corsetti and
Dedola (2011), Aguiar et al. (2014), and Blot et al. (2015)).
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Analyzing the relation of home bias to country-specific variables to decipher the causes of its recent
increase in the Euro area and investigating its potential consequences for sovereign debt crisis thus
seems to matter for better understanding the specific features of the so-called Eurozone crisis. Ac-
cordingly, this paper empirically identifies the macroeconomic shocks that can prompt home bias in
sovereign debt to increase. Using a Bayesian Structural VAR (SVAR) estimation that relies on a new
database built from national sources in a sample of seven Eurozone countries in the 2002-2014 period,
we show that domestic fundamental shocks and country-specific expectations shocks do contribute
to increased home bias in our sample. In addition, we find no evidence in favor of the fact that, every-
thing else being equal, an increase in home bias leads to a decrease in the growth rate in the short-run.
In order to go deeper into the understanding of the empirical results and their implications, we then
propose a simple model of sovereign debt crisis in a monetary union, the assumptions of which are
supported by our empirical results. The model provides microfoundations to explain the recent in-
crease in home bias in the Eurozone and, by modeling the transmission channels of initial probability
of default shocks, it enables to derive a simple prediction: an increase in home bias is associated with
a change in the government’s strategic decision regarding default if, and only if, the destabilizing
impact of the initial shock is high enough relative to the potentially stabilizing impact of the increase
in home bias. In other words, an increase in home bias during a debt crisis may make default less
attractive for national governments, provided that deterioration in fundamentals and in expectations
is comparatively not too strong.
The literature on the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis paid rather scarce attention to the increase in
home bias in public debt in comparison with the possibly strong consequences it may have for fis-
cal strategic decisions. Empirically, Battistini et al. (2014) study how home bias responds to yield
differentials in the Eurozone. Brutti and Sauré (2015) investigate the impact of experiencing a crisis
(defined by a threshold on bond yields) on home bias with a static panel model. Because none of
those papers aim at addressing the consequences of an increasing home bias on the decision of de-
fault, they focus on home bias in banks’ portfolios, defined as the domestic sovereign debt holdings
of the banks in one country scaled by their total assets. By contrast, we address a general measure
of home bias in sovereign debt, the one that matters for the government’s decision. Andritzky (2012)
focuses on disentangling the causal relationship between sovereign bond yields and the share of debt
held by foreigners in a bi-variate panel VAR specification, whereas we identify structural shocks and
distinguish between fundamental and expectations shocks, relying on an updated dataset. To the
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best of our knowledge, no other work investigates the empirical relationship between home bias in
sovereign debt and domestic variables related to sovereign debt sustainability in the Eurozone by
distinguishing fundamental and self-fulfilling drivers and by investigating bi-directional causalities.
On the theoretical side, Broner et al. (2014) argue that creditors’ discrimination can favor purchases
of sovereign debt by domestic investors, which triggers crowding-out effects and may lead to self-
fulfilling dynamics. Mengus (2014) states that home bias in public debt results from the possibility of
post-default bailouts to domestic creditors and identifies the consequences for the borrowing capac-
ity of the sovereign. Gennaioli et al. (2014) focus on the impact of financial development on sovereign
default and show that more developed financial institutions and higher exposure of banks to domes-
tic public debt decrease the probability of default by raising the cost of default. Our paper thus aims
at completing recent theoretical literature by providing empirical results on the relationship between
home bias and country-specific variables and by supporting our simple theoretical model directly by
empirical results, in order to be able to account specifically for the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis
features.
The next section presents empirical facts about home bias in the Eurozone and performs the econo-
metric analysis which is useful for selecting the main assumptions of our theoretical model. Section
3 develops the model of debt crisis with endogenous home bias. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Home bias in the Eurozone
In the following section, we present recent features in the origin and evolution of home bias in
sovereign debt that are specific to the Eurozone. We then identify the shocks that explain most of
the variation in home bias in our sample using a panel SVAR model completed with country-specific
tests and we provide additional results on the impact of home bias on the other endogenous variables.
2.1 Evolution and origin of home bias in sovereign debt
Four main features regarding the recent evolution of home bias in sovereign debt can be identified in
the Eurozone as shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3.3
First, there has been an increase in home bias during the Euro area sovereign debt crisis. The pro-
3Notice that the facts that we emphasize here deal with variation in home bias, and not with the level of home
bias, in a particular context of stress on the sovereign debt market in a monetary union. Consequently, we focus
on the causes and consequences of a short-term increase in home bias in this particular context rather than on
structural factors. The case we investigate is thus different from that of Japan, where home bias in public debt is
known to be structurally high (90% in the first quarter of 2012, according to Andritzky’s database), but stable.
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Figure 1: Evolution of home bias – Sources: National Central Banks (a, b).
portion of domestic holdings of public debt significantly decreased since the creation of the Eurozone
in 1999, revealing a deepening of European financial markets integration (Figure 1 a). Nonetheless,
home bias began increasing again in most Eurozone countries except Germany, in the aftermath of
the global financial crisis and the consecutive debt crisis in the Eurozone. Thus, the increase in home
bias started at the end of 2008 or the beginning of 2009 in peripheral Eurozone countries, and in the
beginning of 2010 in France.
Second, the increase in home bias seems to be higher in the most fragile Eurozone economies, the
so-called GIIPS countries (Figure 1 b).
Third, the increase in home bias displays distinct features across European countries. In Italy and
Figure 2: Foreign (F) and domestic (H) volumes of general government debt holdings (mil-
lion euros) – Source: National Central Banks.
Ireland, the increase is due to a fall in the volume of sovereign debt securities held by non-residents
simultaneous with a rise in the volume held by residents. In Spain, a similar evolution was first ob-
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served, but the volume of general government debt securities held by foreigners started to increase
again around the year 2012, even though it rose more slowly than the volume held at home. In Greece,
the increase in home bias is due to a fall in both volumes in the most recent quarters (Figure 2), with
foreign holdings decreasing faster. In Portugal, the rise is due to the increasing volume of debt se-
curities held by residents, which has recently grown faster than the volume held by non-residents
(however, evolution in volumes are not available before 2007 for Portugal).4
Fourth, the banking and financial sectors hold a significant share of domestic public debt, which
deepens the intertwining between sovereign debt risk and banking sector risk (Acharya et al., 2014).
More notably, this intertwining has recently increased, with a stronger exposure of domestic banks to
domestic sovereign debt (Figure 3). This feature is clearly more significant in the Eurozone compared
Figure 3: Evolution of domestic banks’ sovereign debt holdings – Source: Merler and Pisani-
Ferry (2012).
with the UK and the US.
We now conduct empirical tests to provide further insights on the exogenous factors that positively
affect home bias and on the direct consequences of the increase in home bias on domestic variables.
2.2 Empirical Tests
We rely on a sample of seven Eurozone economies for which data on home bias in sovereign debt is
available, and which faced either a significant increase in home bias (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
4Note that the debt volumes displayed in Figure 2 are distinct from total general government debt volumes for
most countries. We provide details on how the data on home bias were calculated for each country in Appendix
A, based on data availability and comparability issues. In addition, the data on volumes in the case of France are
not made available by the Bank of France.
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Spain), a more recent increase in home bias (France) or a decrease in home bias (Germany),5 between
2002:Q1 and 2014:Q4 for all countries in the sample except Portugal, for which data is available only
from 2007:Q4 onwards. For the latter, a country-specific analysis is performed.
The start of the period of study is chosen so that it is the longest possible one while including only
post-Euro area data – in order to focus on factors affecting home bias in the context of a monetary
union – and so that all data is available for all quarters for all countries (except for Portugal for which
tests are performed separately), which allows to rely only on official data without the need to use
extrapolation methods.6 The VIX variable, which is widely used as a proxy for global risk aversion
and uncertainty and which is included in our empirical model as explained below, enables to control
for time variations related to the global financial crisis period.
The increase in home bias observed in most of the sample is sudden and approximately coincides with
the start of the stress period on the Eurozone debt markets. Therefore, it seems consistent to interpret
the increase in home bias as the result of unexpected exogenous shocks. This is why we investigate
the impact of distinct shocks on the dynamics of home bias to identify the most explanatory ones in
our sample, relying on a SVAR model.
The empirical model Distinct arguments support our empirical strategy. First, the SVAR model
enables us to perform an analysis of unexpected shocks. Second, our identification strategy allows us
to interpret the shocks in economic terms, differently to a simple VAR model. Third, an SVAR model
makes it possible to analyze bi-directional causalities without facing endogeneity issues. Therefore,
we can both determine the shocks that prompt home bias to respond positively and the impact of
home bias shocks on the other variables in the model.
Our SVAR model includes 5 variables. In a first step, we identify the main sources of variation in
home bias (hb) in public debt and in a second step, we investigate the impact of home bias shocks
on the other endogenous variables. We built a new dataset on home bias relying on national sources
(national central banks). Whenever possible, our home bias variable measures the share of general
government debt securities held by residents (in % of total) rather than the share of total general
government debt held at home for two reasons. First, for Ireland, France and Portugal, no time se-
ries on the decomposition between the resident sector and the foreign sector are available for total
debt, whereas Germany is the only country in our sample for which the decomposition between the
5Even though our sample is limited by data availability, it includes the biggest Eurozone countries and all the
GIIPS, on which concerns focused during the recent crisis.
6Most data is not available before 2002 and the period of study then allows to exclude the dot-com bub-
ble/bust period.
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resident and the foreign sector is not available for debt securities over our whole period of study.
Therefore, focusing on debt securities ensures more homogeneity in the cross-section data. Second,
this variable allows to focus on marketable government debt which is widely traded between do-
mestic and foreign investors, following Andritzky (2012). Appendix A provides details on the data
we relied on for each country in our sample. Following the literature (Andritzky (2012), Battistini
et al. (2014), and Brutti and Sauré (2015)), we focus on the share rather than on volumes because the
share exhibits a common pattern in fragile economies in our sample and reflects the relative evolution
in domestic and foreign holdings, which is expected to be affected following a shock to a country’s
sovereign risk, as the latter modifies domestic and foreign demand for domestic government debt
securities in a distinct manner. Finally, volumes also depend on many other factors, such as the evo-
lution of total debt (and thus of government financing needs) and trade-off opportunities relative to
other assets. All these arguments plead in favor of using shares, as they will only capture the factors
impacting differently domestic and foreign demand for domestic debt securities.
There are two types of sources of variation in home bias in our SVAR: fundamental shocks and ex-
pectations shocks, both domestic and global. The fundamental fiscal shock that we consider is a debt
to GDP ratio shock (debt), as the debt to GDP ratio (in %) is widely used for assessing the fiscal funda-
mental situation of a country (see e.g. De Grauwe and Ji (2013)) and has the merit of being available
for all countries over our whole period of study. A higher debt to GDP ratio means that the debt
burden relative to the size of the economy is higher and is thus expected to increase the probability
of sovereign default, and therefore to raise home bias in sovereign debt, due to diverging incentives
to buy the debt for domestic and foreign investors. In addition, we include two distinct expectations
variables in the SVAR. First, we consider global, non-European-specific expectations, as proxied by
the VIX (vix) in %, which represents the near term volatility conveyed by stock index option prices
(S&P 500 index) and is widely used as a proxy for global risk aversion. Indeed, Favero and Giavazzi
(2008), among others, have shown that the Eurozone economies are deeply affected by global con-
ditions and Andritzky (2012) argues that the strong increase in global risk aversion following the
subprime financial crisis may have pushed foreign investors to retract from advanced financial mar-
kets. In addition, the inclusion of the VIX variable in the SVAR enables to control for time variations
related to the global crisis period, as it proxies uncertainty and global liquidity (Matsumoto, 2015).
Second, we consider country-specific expectations of sovereign default. We proxy a country-specific
expectations of default shock with a 10-year sovereign bond yield spread shock (spread), with the
fundamental control variables and the global expectations variable remaining constant (shocks are
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indeed orthogonalized). The variable spread is calculated as the difference (in %) between the US
yield and the German yield for Germany and as the difference between the German yield and each
country yield for all other countries in the sample. It is the most widely used measure for country-
specific expectations of sovereign default (see e.g. De Grauwe and Ji (2013)).
Additionally, we include the quarter-on-quarter change of seasonally adjusted GDP at constant prices
(gdpgt) as a further domestic fundamental control variable (Schumacher, 2014). Including the growth
rate in the SVAR also allows to test the theoretical prediction according to which an increased home
bias negatively affects growth (Broner et al., 2014).7
Data on VIX comes from the CBOE and data on 10-year government bond yields, seasonally adjusted
quarter-on-quarter change in real GDP and debt to GDP ratio were extracted from the Eurostat and
OECD databases. The reduced form of the panel vector autoregressive model with q lags VAR(q) is:
Yi,t =
q∑
j=1
AjYi,t−j + ei,t,
where Yi,t is the vector of 5 endogenous variables for country i and period t, Yi,t−j the vector of lagged
variables, Aj the 5× 5 parameter matrix, and ei,t = bi + bi,t, where bi is a vector of individual specific
constants that vary with i, which controls for individual fixed effects, and bi,t is the disturbance term
with E(bi,t) = 0. Its variance-covariance matrix E(bi,tbTi,t) = Ω is unrestricted.
8 Time fixed effects are
controlled for by the VIX variable, which varies over time but not between countries, and which is
expected to capture time-specific global expectations and global liquidity conditions.
The VAR(q) model can be rewritten using the lag operator L:9
A(L)Yi,t = ei,t.
7Another variable of interest could be liquidity injections by the ECB, as they may have prompted home bias
to increase by providing liquidity to domestic investors wishing to invest in domestic debt securities. At the same
time, liquidity injections may have helped restoring confidence and thus limiting expectation shocks. However,
liquidity injections by the ECB are still recent with the first long-term refinancing operations being conducted in
April 2008 and most significant LTRO being implemented only from 2011 onwards, which makes it difficult to
properly test for their impact.
8The notation .T refers to the transpose vector.
9Relying on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz’ Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC),
we retained 1 lag in our estimation.
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Relying on the Wold theorem, the canonical VAR model can be reverted. Thus, we can rewrite the
process in moving average infinite structural form:
Yi,t =
∞∑
k=0
Ckei,t−k = C(L)ei,t,
with ei,t representing the vector of canonical innovations. This allows to derive the impulse response
functions and the forecast error variance decomposition. The structural Moving Average representa-
tion is then:
Yi,t =
∞∑
k=0
Θkεi,t−k = Θ(L)εi,t,
where εi,t = di + di,t, and bi,t = Pdi,t (Beetsma et al. (2006), and Canova and Ciccarelli (2013)).
P is a 5×5 invertible matrix. It needs to be estimated for identifying the structural shocks. The short-
run constraints consist in setting some elements of the matrix P to zero. The Θk matrix represents the
response functions of Yi,t to structural shocks di,t. Structural shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated
and to have a unit variance: E(di,tdTi,t) = I5. With Ω the variance-covariance matrix of the canonical
innovations bi,t, we have: E(bi,tbTi,t) = PE(di,td
T
i,t)P
T = PPT = Ω.
For the estimation of our panel SVAR, we rely on Bayesian inference, which is not affected by the
presence of unit roots (Sims (1988), Sims and Uhlig (1991), and Uhlig (1994)). Consequently, first dif-
ferencing the variables is not necessary, even though some of them are not stationary. Performing the
econometric tests on the variables in levels then enables better interpretation regarding significance
and sign of the results. As is standard in literature (Mackowiack (2007), and Kim and Roubini (2000)),
we rely on the standard prior distributions of Sims and Zha (1998). They present several advantages.
First, they are not flat, thus enabling to incorporate prior information. Second, they do not imply any
restriction on the conditional mean of lagged variable coefficients. Nevertheless, beliefs about lagged
variable coefficients are restricted to be Gaussian and uncorrelated across equations conditional on
contemporaneous variable coefficients. However, they are allowed to be correlated differently in dis-
tinct equations.
We define Y =

hb
spread
debt
gdpgt
vix

the vector of endogenous variables, and εt =

εhb
εspread
εdebt
εgdpgt
εext

the vector of
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structural shocks, where εhb, εspread, εdebt, and εgdpgt are four domestic shocks: respectively the home
bias shock, the spread shock, the debt shock and the real supply shock, and εext represents the global
financial shock.
The short-run restrictions We only impose short-run restrictions. We aim at identifying the 25
elements of the P matrix. The Ω matrix is symmetric and the shocks have a one-unit variance. This
implies that 15 orthogonalization and normalization constraints have already been imposed. Thus,
it is necessary to determine the 10 remaining constraints by relying on the economic literature. First,
we assume that global risk aversion is contemporaneously exogenous to domestic shocks in the Eu-
rozone countries. Indeed, the VIX, as a proxy for global non-European financial conditions, is ex-
pected to affect the European financial markets in a first step and then to be potentially impacted by
the impaired conditions in the European countries through a feedback effect only in a second step
(Gonzalez-Hermosillo and Johnson, 2014).10 Second, as is standard in the literature, we assume that
the real variables (GDP and debt to GDP ratio) react with a lag to financial disturbances (domestic
and global: spreads and VIX) and to the composition of debt (hb) due to reaction delays (Kim (2005),
Favero and Giavazzi (2008), Prieto et al. (2013), and Allegret et al. (2014)).
Therefore, given the ordering in the Y matrix, the P matrix of restrictions is defined as:
P =

1 X X X X
P21 1 P23 P24 P25
0 0 1 P34 0
0 0 P43 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
.
2.3 Interpretation of results
We focus first on the interpretation of the impulse response functions for the whole panel (six coun-
tries) depicted on Figure 4, which address the dynamics and impact of home bias.11 Our choice of a
panel data analysis is motivated by the fact that we want to identify the common factors behind the
increase in home bias for most of the countries in the sample. We want to establish a general transmis-
10Note that we impose the exogeneity of the VIX variable only in the first period. The VIX is allowed to
respond to domestic shocks in the following periods. However, the results displayed below show that the VIX
does not seem to significantly react to home bias and spread shocks in the Euro area in our sample. As for the
debt and the gdp shocks, their contribution to the variation in the VIX is weak. Similarly, Favero and Giavazzi
(2008) consider that the US economy behaves as a closed economy and is therefore not impacted by economic
conditions in Eurozone countries, which justifies that they consider the US variables as the most exogenous ones
with respect to Euro area variables shocks.
11As the data on home bias is available only over the period 2007-2014 for Portugal, it is not included in our
panel tests but it is used in an individual test over the recent period (as it is available monthly) in order to provide
additional and more refined results.
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sion mechanism between our variables of interest that would be relevant for the entire sample once
individual heterogeneity is controlled for and that would allow for obtaining non-country-specific
results regarding home bias. The distinct impulse response functions show the responses of domestic
variables and of the global financial conditions indicator following each shock. They were gener-
ated using the Sims and Zha (1999) Bayesian Monte-Carlo integration method. The standard errors
associated with a one standard error deviation shock were calculated with the same method.12 The
associated forecast error variance decompositions, which allow for a comparison of the relative im-
portance of each shock in explaining the dynamics of the distinct variables, are displayed in Appendix
C. Shocks are named in columns and responses of variables to shocks are displayed in rows.
Figure 4: Panel impulse response functions – Whole sample
First, Figure 4 shows that a debt to GDP ratio shock triggers a positive significant response in home
bias. Similarly, Schmidt and Zwick (2015) and Brutti and Sauré (2015) show that country-specific risk
factors are crucial in explaining extreme capital flows in the Euro area. As this result is significant at
the panel level, it suggests that debt shocks impact positively home bias both in countries where its
recent increase was driven by a decrease in foreign volume and an increase in domestic volume and
in countries where it was driven by domestic volume increasing faster than foreign volume, what is
also confirmed by invididual tests presented below. This is consistent with our interpretation that
home bias increases following probability of default shocks, which provides less incentives to foreign
creditors to buy domestic debt securities relative to domestic creditors – the mechanism is developed
12The confidence interval calculated from the Sims and Zha (1999) procedure outperforms other procedures
for short horizons (Kilian and Chang, 2000). Error bands correspond to the 16% and 84% quartiles. Results are
significant if the confidence interval does not include the 0 axis.
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in the theoretical section –, and which can translate both into an increase in domestic holdings simul-
taneous with a decrease in foreign holdings and into foreign holdings increasing less than domestic
volumes, depending on the size of the shock.
Second, Figure 4 shows that a positive GDP shock contemporaneously generates a decrease in home
bias but is not persistent. An unexpected exogenous increase in GDP provides a comforting signal
on the fundamental economic situation of a particular country, which causes foreign investors to in-
crease their participation on the sovereign debt market of this country. Therefore, home bias seems
to react to sudden impaired domestic fundamentals. This deepens the differences between incentives
for domestic and foreign creditors to invest in domestic sovereign debt, as emphasized by previous
literature, notably Battistini et al. (2014).
Third, Figure 4 depicts an increase in home bias in response to a positive VIX shock. This result
is intuitive: when global risk aversion unexpectedly increases, foreign investors may become more
cautious and invest less in public debt abroad, particularly the most risky one, as highlighted by An-
dritzky (2012).
Regarding the relative importance of the impact of each shock on home bias, the variance decompo-
sition (Appendix C, Table 1) reveals that the fundamental shock explains 11.64% of the variation in
home bias 1 quarter after the shock and 26.18% 12 quarters after the shock. The fiscal fundamental
shock thus has a significant and persistent effect on home bias. After the fiscal fundamental shock,
the GDP shock is the main contemporaneous driver of the increase in home bias, explaining 2.15% of
the variation in home bias 1 quarter after its occurrence (against 0.35% for the VIX shock). However,
12 quarters after its occurrence, the VIX shock explains 10.06% of the variation in home bias (whereas
the GDP shock no longer has a significant impact). Finally, in the panel tests on the sample of six
countries, home bias does not significantly react to spread shocks. However, additional tests reveal
that, as expected following Broner et al. (2014) and Brutti and Sauré (2015), in some countries, home
bias does respond positively and significantly to spread shocks, as is made clear below.
To fully exploit the results of our SVAR estimation, another conclusion that we can draw is the im-
pact of a home bias shock on the dynamics of the growth rate. Indeed, one significant advantage
of the SVAR is that it enables to distinguish between bi-directional transmission mechanisms. The
theoretical literature emphasizes a possibly destabilizing causal effect of increased home bias on the
growth rate through crowding-out effects. Indeed, Broner et al. (2014) show that, due to financial
frictions, increasing incentives for domestic investors to buy public debt when its return rises disrupt
domestic productive investment, which in turn reduces growth. Another possible effect of increasing
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home bias on the growth rate may be related to its potentially negative impact on domestic banks’
credit supply due to banks’ exposure to sovereign risk, eventually reducing investment and growth
(Acharya et al., 2012). Nevertheless, we cannot find empirical evidence of a negative transmission
mechanism to the growth rate: the latter actually even responds slightly positively to home bias
shocks in our sample. Nevertheless, the relative impact of the home bias shock on the growth rate is
rather weak (the variance decomposition reveals that the home bias shock explains a small 0.12% of
the variation in the quarter-on-quarter growth rate 2 quarters after its occurrence, against 7.06% for
the VIX shock for instance). One possible explanation for this result could be that the negative impact
of home bias on the growth rate is likely to be very indirect and not to occur in the short run. In
particular, Cantero-Saiz et al. (2014) show that in periods of easy monetary policy, no systematic lin-
ear relationship between sovereign risk and credit supply exists in Europe. Moreover, our empirical
result may relativize the extent of the financial frictions and the prominence of residents in domestic
productive investment assumed in the theoretical literature (see Broner et al. (2014)). Our results still
hold when we substitute the quarter-on-quarter change in growth rate with the year-on-year change
in growth rate. Consequently, because we cannot find empirical grounds to plead for a direct nega-
tive effect of increasing home bias on the growth rate in our sample, we choose not to include it in
our theoretical model of Section 3. Finally, regarding the impact of home bias on the other variables,
a home bias shock does not significantly affect spreads – suggesting that markets do not incorporate
the home bias variable in risk assessment, possibly due to data availability timing –, and generates a
negative response of debt. While the latter result may sound surprising, it disappears when tests are
performed over two sub-periods as we shall see below.
2.4 Additional tests
To refine our panel analysis, we conduct additional tests.
In a first step, following De Grauwe and Ji (2013), we perform the empirical tests for the whole sam-
ple on two sub-periods, 2002-2007 and 2008-2014, in order to account for possible differences in the
post-crisis period.13 Even if the time periods are thus short, impulse response functions presented on
Figures 9 and 10 reported in Appendix B and variance decompositions reported in Tables 2 and 3 in
Appendix C allow to provide some information on differences between the two periods. Results are
however mostly in line with the whole sample analysis. Home bias in sovereign debt still responds
13We performed a Chow test in our SVAR in order to test for the presence of a structural break around the year
2008, as in De Grauwe and Ji (2013). The Chi-2 statistic that we obtain is 97.5 (with 60 degrees of freedeom), with
an associated P-value of 0.002, which justifies that we conduct a separate analysis.
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positively and significantly to debt to GDP ratio shocks in both sub-samples, even though with some
lag in the last one. Similarly, home bias still responds negatively to GDP shocks in both sub-periods.
The GDP shock thus explains 6.42% of the home bias variation 12 quarters after its occurrence in the
second sub-period, which is even higher than the share explained by the debt shock. Consistently
with the whole sample estimation results, home bias shocks do not affect the spreads in both sub-
samples. They do not affect the debt to GDP ratio neither nor the GDP growth rate. However, spread
shocks have a significant positive impact (with some lag) in the first sub-period, explaining 4.65% of
the variation in home bias 4 quarters after its occurrence and 11.85% 12 quarters after its occurrence.
Finally, VIX shocks do not have a significant impact on home bias in the first sub-period and they
have a significant impact on home bias after 7 quarters only in the second sub-period, which sug-
gests that VIX shocks are showed to play a role in the largest sample because more variation in global
conditions is observed over the whole period. This decomposition into two sub-periods thus allows
us to provide more refined results regarding the differences which exist between the pre- and the
post-crisis periods. However, as the results are roughly consistent with the whole period estimation
results and because we are not directly interested in the estimated parameters of our VAR, we focus
on the whole period in the following tests, which allows to rely on larger data.
In a second step, as our sample includes both debtor and creditor countries, we also perform the tests
on a smaller sample restricted to the debtor countries. We thus conduct the same analysis as for the
whole period, but on a panel including four countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Spain, that is the
GIIPS countries for which we have data over the whole period. The focus on those countries avoids
too much sample heterogeneity. Impulse response functions depicted on Figure 11 in Appendix B
exhibit very similar patterns as those of Figure 4 involving the whole sample except that the impact
of a GDP shock on home bias is even less persistent (see also the variance decomposition available in
Table 4 reported in Appendix C).
Third, in order to emphasize some country-specific relationships between our variables of interest
and refine our results, we exploit the fact that some national central banks have started to disclose
monthly data on resident and foreign holdings of domestic sovereign debt in order to perform in-
dividual tests, as it allows us to rely on larger individual time series. When monthly data on home
bias in sovereign debt securities was available, we performed additional country-specific tests over
the period 2002-2014 (for Ireland, Italy and Spain) and over the period 2007-2014 for Portugal (due
to data availability). This analysis allows to specify the results, which are expected to display some
country-specific features. As GDP is not available monthly, we use the month-on-month change (%)
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in industrial production as a proxy. As for the debt to GDP ratio, we substitute it by the ratio of the
volume of the proxy for total debt used in the calculation of home bias (as it is then available monthly)
over the yearly GDP (%), that is, government debt securities. It appears that in Ireland, fundamental
debt shocks explain a very large part of the variation in home bias (Figure 12 in Appendix B). Indeed,
the variance decomposition (Table 5 in Appendix C) reveals that the debt shock explains 34.93% of
the variation in home bias 12 quarters after its occurrence. By contrast, the individual tests allow to
see that spread shocks do have a significant positive impact on the dynamics of home bias after some
lag in Italy, Spain and Portugal and even that they explain a larger variation in home bias relative to
fundamental shocks (Figures 13, 14, and 15 in Appendix B) and have a persistent effect.14 This is par-
ticularly true for Italy, for which the variance decomposition (Table 6 in Appendix C) shows that the
spread shock explains more than 6% of the variation in home bias 4 quarters after the shock (against
0.64% for the debt shock) and more than 27% 12 quarters after the shock (against 1.79% for the debt
shock). In Portugal (Table 8 in Appendix C), the expectations shock explains almost 35% of the vari-
ation in home bias 12 quarters after the shock (against 11.27% in Spain (Table 7 in Appendix C)).
Interestingly, it appears that expectation shocks impact the variation in home bias in countries which
were identified as being particularly prone to self-fulfilling dynamics in the Eurozone sovereign debt
crisis (De Grauwe and Ji, 2013). The fact that home bias positively responds to spread shocks is in ac-
cordance with Broner et al. (2014) (in which the marginal buyer of sovereign bonds becomes a domes-
tic one following a sovereign bond return shock) and with the empirical investigation of Andritzky
(2012). This shock can affect home bias dynamics through various intermediary channels. Following
Brutti and Sauré (2015), our interpretation of this effect is that the transmission channel between the
expectations shock and home bias dynamics relates to the increase in the expected probability of de-
fault triggered by more pessimistic expectations (the so-called self-fulfilling effect), which provides
more incentives for domestic investors to invest in domestic sovereign debt relative to foreign ones.
In addition, the individual tests provide robustness checks regarding the effect of home bias shocks
on the growth rate: the growth rate is not found to respond negatively to home bias shocks in any
of the 4 countries for which monthly data is available. Note that this result holds both in countries
where home bias in sovereign debt increased due to an increase in domestic volume and a decrease in
foreign volume of domestic debt securities and in countries where home bias rose due to an increase
14Note that spread shocks also have a significant impact on the dynamics of home bias in the panel tests as
soon as Greece, which displays some specific features due to partial default on its debt in March 2012, is removed
from the sample. We interpret the sovereign bond spread shock as an expectation shock because it represents
a one standard error deviation in the risk premium, with all of the other endogenous variables of the empirical
model – particularly the debt variable – remaining constant.
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in both volumes, with the domestic volume increasing faster.
To sum-up, additional tests confirm that two shocks significantly explain variations in home bias – at
least in some countries of our sample: the debt shock and the expectation (spread) shock. In addition,
the growth rate shock also plays a significant role, in particular in the most recent period. All those
shocks are domestic shocks, which play a major role in comparison to the external shock.
2.5 Robustness checks
We now provide some robustness checks, by testing the sensitivity of our results to alternative iden-
tification strategies in our panel SVAR. As we relied on short-run restrictions, we test the robustness
of our results to three distinct triangular Cholesky decompositions of the P matrix. We retained
those three distinct decompositions so that we still incorporate restrictions consistent with economic
theory in choosing the ordering of the variables (namely that real variables do not react contempo-
raneously to financial variables and that the VIX variable is the most exogenous variable among the
three financial variables), but we test alternative ordering between real variables on the one hand
and between financial variables on the other hand. The first Cholesky decomposition C1, the sec-
ond Cholesky decomposition C2 and the third Cholesky decomposition C3 that we investigate are
based on the following variables ordering (from the most exogenous one to the least exogenous one):
C1 =

debt
gdp
vix
spread
hb

, C2 =

gdp
debt
vix
spread
hb

, and C3 =

debt
gdp
vix
hb
spread

.
Results for the whole sample tests are displayed in Figures 16, 17, and 18 reported in Appendix B and
Tables 9, 10, and 11 reported in Appendix C.15 It appears that the results are similar to those obtained
with the short-run restrictions. One slight difference is that spread responds negatively to home bias
shocks with the first and the second Cholesky decomposition (in which spreads are assumed to be
more exogenous than home bias), but this effect is very small relative to that of other shocks, as at-
tested by the variance decomposition (Tables 9 and 10). It however tends to suggest that if an increase
in home bias has any impact on expectations of default, it is a stabilizing one.
15We performed all additional tests under the three alternative identification strategies. Overall, results are
robust to alternative identification schemes and are available upon request.
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Now that we have identified the most important sources of exogenous variation in home bias in our
empirical model, we examine their impact on the equilibrium of a simple model of sovereign debt
crisis in which home bias affects the strategic decision of national governments regarding sovereign
default. This allows us to formalize our interpretation of the transmission mechanism between ex-
ogenous variations in fundamentals or expectations and home bias and to characterize the conditions
under which an increase in home bias is associated with sovereign default. As the strategic decision
of the government, depending on home bias, is hardly observable, and the impact of home bias on
default cannot be properly tested in the Eurozone due to specific features of the recent sovereign debt
crisis and the absence of a number of default episodes, relying on a stylized model allows to formalize
and to sum-up in a concise way a simple prediction on the factors that play a role in determining the
consequences of the increase in home bias for debt sustainability.
3 A simple model of debt crisis with endogenous home bias
We now propose a stylized model of sovereign debt crisis in a monetary union, the assumptions
of which are supported by our empirical results. It aims at replicating the recent rise in home bias
associated with an increase in sovereign bond yields and at characterizing its consequences for the
government’s decision to default.
3.1 The sequential game
Our setting is a two-period strategic game involving three different players: domestic investors, for-
eign investors and the government.
The investors’ decision In period 1, the government aims at rolling over an exogenous amount
of one-period maturity debt d1 on the primary sovereign bonds market. Each group of investors
(the group of domestic creditors and the group of foreign ones) consists of a continuum of identical
agents over the interval [0;1]. All individual investors have logarithmic utility and the same initial
endowment W1 at the beginning of period 1. In period 1, each individual investor – be it domestic
or foreign – chooses the level of his current consumption C1. He allocates the remaining part of his
initial wealth W1 − C1 between risky sovereign bonds, which yield an uncertain return determined
endogenously on the sovereign bonds market and which is paid only in the absence of sovereign
default, and a risk-free world asset which yields a constant certain exogenous return. A worldwide
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random macroeconomic shock X (with density probability f ) affecting the government’s fiscal deci-
sion (a higher realization x˜ of the shock positively affects the government’s solvency) occurs at the
beginning of period 2. As they do not know the realization of the shock when they make their de-
cision in period 1, investors cannot know with certainty whether the outcome will be default or not.
Therefore, they make their decision based on the expected probability of default in period 1, pe.
The timeline of the game is displayed in Figure 5.16
Figure 5: Timeline of the sequential game
The maximization programme of an individual investor in each group is the following (with j =
(D,F ) a general subscript, the subscript D referring to domestic investors, the subscript F to foreign
ones):
max
C1,j ,ωj
E1[U(C1,j , C2,j)] = max
C1,j ,ωj
ln(C1,j) + βE1[ln(C2,j)],
s.t.
C1,j +
E1[C2,j ]
E1[RT,j ]
≤W1,
E1[RT,j ] = (1− ωj)Rf + ωjE1[Rj ],
0 ≤ ωj ≤ 1,
where ωj is the share of post-consumption wealth (W1 − C1,j) invested in domestic sovereign bonds
(with 1− ωj the share invested in the risk-free asset), β is the discount factor, RT,j is the total amount
16After the government makes its decision regarding default, the monetary policy authority – in the Eurozone,
the ECB – can take action in order to avoid a sovereign default. Indeed, it can affect the government’s political
costs (notably, the cost of default), grant rescue loans with preferential conditions, buy government debt at lower
interest rates on the secondary market, and refinance banks that are holding sovereign bonds. In addition, the
ECB can affect ex ante expectations, notably through liquidity injections and commitment or announcement that
it will intervene to help countries facing difficulties. Nevertheless, endogenizing the ECB’s strategic decision is
beyond the scope of this paper as it is unlikely to be affected by home bias.
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by which the portfolio-invested wealth is multiplied (thus including the repayment of the principal
and the return paid on both types of assets),Rf = 1+rf with rf the constant certain exogenous return
on the risk-free world asset andRj is the amount paid to investors on sovereign bonds including both
the implicit endogenous return on bonds and the repayment of the principal (when j = D, it corre-
sponds to the amount for domestic creditors and when j = F to the amount for foreign creditors).
For a given nominal equilibrium interest rate i∗(pe) on domestic sovereign bonds depending on the
expected probability of default pe, as will be made clear below, and a given home bias in sovereign
debt H∗ in equilibrium, the expected amount paid to domestic creditors on their investment in
sovereign bonds E1[R∗D] writes:
E1[R
∗
D] = (1 + i
∗
D)(1− pe) + 0.pe = (1 + i∗D)(1− pe),
and the expected amount paid to foreign creditors E1[R∗F ] writes:
E1[R
∗
F ] = (1 + i
∗
F )(1− pe),
where i∗D is the expected implicit return on domestic sovereign bonds for domestic creditors in equi-
librium and i∗F is the expected implicit return for foreign creditors. When sovereign default occurs
(with expected probability pe), sovereign bonds yield a null return and the principal is not recovered
by the creditors. When no sovereign default occurs (with expected probability 1 − pe), the creditors
recover the principal (W1 − C1,j)ωj and the implicit equilibrium return i∗j on the principal. The im-
plicit equilibrium return for domestic investors i∗D differs from the implicit equilibrium return for
foreign investors i∗F . This results from some additional costs (for foreigners) or additional benefits
(for domestic creditors) of investing in domestic sovereign bonds which are added to the nominal
equilibrium interest rate on bonds i∗(pe) such that i∗F 6 i∗D. These additional costs and benefits differ
all the more so in the midst of a stressful episode on the sovereign debt market. Indeed, as empha-
sized in the empirical literature, in the context of the Eurozone debt crisis, incentives to invest in the
sovereign debt of the most fragile economies have decreased for foreign investors and increased (or
at least decreased less) for domestic ones. Thus, Battistini et al. (2014) (p. 205) identified several types
of increasing incentives for residents to invest in their own sovereign debt in fragile economies of the
Eurozone.17
17The first one is the pressure government can exert on domestic banks to have them buy public debt – finan-
cial repression in the words of Reinhart and Sbrancia (2015). Moral suasion in the recent Eurozone debt crisis
was thoroughly documented by Van Riet (2014). Investing in domestic sovereign bonds thus saves the cost of not
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Therefore, i∗D and i
∗
F can be rewritten as functions iD(i
∗(pe)
+
, pe
+
) and iF (i∗(pe)
+
, pe
−
) of the expected
probability of default pe and of the equilibrium nominal return on sovereign debt i∗(pe).
The equilibrium interest rate on domestic sovereign bonds i∗(pe) is the interest rate for which market
clears, that is to say the interest rate for which total demand for domestic sovereign bonds QT (i, pe)
equals the exogenous supply amount of domestic sovereign debt d1:
QT (i
∗(pe), pe) = d1.
By definition, equilibrium home bias is the share of domestic debt held by domestic investors in the
point where market clears:
H∗ = H(i∗(pe), pe) =
Q∗D
Q∗D +Q
∗
F
=
ω∗D
ω∗D + ω
∗
F
=
ω∗D(W1 − C∗1 )
d1
.
The government’s decision In period 2, the government observes the aggregate decision of all
creditors (i∗(pe), H∗) and the realization of the macroeconomic shock x˜which occurs at the beginning
of period 2. It then decides between paying back the debt (which in period 2 includes interest rate
payments: d2 = d1(1 + i∗(pe))) or defaulting on its full debt.18 As in Gennaioli et al. (2014) and
Mengus (2014), the government is non-discriminatory regarding default in our model.19
To make its decision regarding fiscal policy in period 2, the government strategically compares the
cost of debt repayment Lf with the cost of full default Ld, and chooses the least costly option. Thus,
the optimizing government focuses on minimizing the economic and political costs of its fiscal policy.
The loss function in case of default Ld is related to the economic cost of a sovereign default for the
domestic economy and to the political and economic cost of creditors opposition to default.20
complying with government’s pressure. The second one is that undercapitalized banks, that are mostly located
in peripheral countries, can choose to engage in ’carry-trades’ by going long on more risky public debt and short
on less risky one (see also Gennaioli et al. (2014)). The third one is related to a possible exit from the Eurozone,
in which domestic investors would have a comparative advantage, as sovereign debt would be redenominated
in national currency, what would be costly for foreign creditors. In addition, expectations of potential compen-
sations of residents following a default (Mengus (2014), and Brutti and Sauré (2015)) can provide incentives for
domestic purchases of debt. The first two reasons can only explain why banks have increased their exposure to
domestic sovereign debt while the last two also apply to non-bank domestic investors.
18We focus on the binary alternative between full repayment and full default without taking into account the
possibility of a partial haircut on debt. Nevertheless, the mechanism and results of the model would be similar
when allowing for a haircut.
19This can be justified by trading on the secondary market (or by the one-period maturity of debt in our
simple case), portfolios’ unobservability and the monetary union that renders a selective default very unlikely.
Gennaioli et al. (2014) provide empirical results supporting the non-discriminatory assumption. See also Panizza
et al. (2009).
20The specificity of such loss functions in a monetary union is that national governments do not control mone-
tary policy and thus cannot monetize debt, which reinforces the impact of the latter on the government’s decision.
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Both the cost of debt repayment and the cost of default increase in the debt:
∂Ld
∂d1
> 0,
∂Lf
∂d1
> 0, with
∂Lf
∂d1
>
∂Ld
∂d1
,
as the probability of default increases in the debt.
In addition,
∂Ld
∂x˜
> 0,
∂Lf
∂x˜
< 0,
as a higher realization of the X shock positively affects the government’s solvency.
Both loss functions increase in the market interest rate on sovereign bonds i∗(pe) as it raises debt
service, and therefore raises debt in period 2. The loss function in case of default Ld increases more,
as the probability of default increases when debt service rises. Home bias in equilibrium H∗ raises
the cost of default as it raises the impact of a sovereign default for the domestic economy (Mengus,
2014) by increasing the domestic share of debt defaulted on, along with the domestic volume of debt
defaulted on as soon as the debt volume remains constant or increases.21
Finally, in period 1, before the realization of the macroeconomic shock, the true probability of default
p∗ (the probability that Lf > Ld) is the probability of default averaged over the whole distribution of
the shocks for a given amount of debt and given aggregate outcomes: 22
p∗ = p(d1, H∗, i∗(pe)) =
∫
p[d1
+
, H∗− , i
∗
+
, x˜−]f(x)dx.
As agents are assumed to hold rational expectations, in equilibrium, pe = p∗, such that the expected
probability of default is in fine validated.
We now solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the model.
3.2 Characterization of the subgame perfect Nash equilibria
Investors’ best response under uncertainty on the ex post outcome In order to characterize
the optimal decision for an individual investor such that he does not have incentives to deviate from
This specificity also renders the Eurozone countries more prone to self-fulfilling crises due to liquidity shortages
converting into solvency crises (De Grauwe and Ji (2013), and Corsetti and Dedola (2013)).
21Acharya et al. (2014) and Gennaioli et al. (2014) relate the internal domestic cost of default to domestic
banks’ holdings of domestic sovereign bonds. Gennaioli et al. (2014) provide empirical evidence that the larger
the exposure of domestic banks to sovereign risk, the more costly the default for the domestic economy through
its ex post impact on private credit.
22p in the following equation is a function, as for given values of the model’s parameters, of the endogenous
variables in equilibrium, and of the shock, it takes one and only one value.
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equilibrium, the action of all other players are taken as given. This means that both the strategy of
all other investors (in the same group and in the other group) – and then the aggregate outcomes
resulting from these individual actions i∗(pe) and H∗ – and the strategy of the government prior to
the realization of the shock (captured by the expected probability of default pe) are taken as given in
order to derive the individual investor’s best response.
The first order conditions for each individual investor yield:
C∗1 =
1
1 + β
W1,
ω∗D = max
[
min
(
iD(i
∗(pe), pe)− rf − pe(1 + iD(i∗(pe), pe))
iD(i∗(pe), pe)− rf , 1
)
, 0
]
,
ω∗F = max
[
min
(
iF (i
∗(pe), pe)− rf − pe(1 + iF (i∗(pe), pe))
iF (i∗(pe), pe)− rf , 1
)
, 0
]
.
This determines the aggregate outcomes H∗ and i∗(pe) for a given expected probability of default pe.
Figure 6 illustrates the endogenous home bias.
Q
i
QT
QD
QF
i*
QD
*
= H* QT
*
d1
Figure 6: Endogenous home bias
The government’s best response At the time the government plays its optimal strategy (at the
end of period 2), if: Lf (d1, H∗, i∗(pe), x˜) − Ld(d1, H∗, i∗(pe), x˜) < 0, the government’s best response
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to creditors’ action is to pay back the debt, as it is less costly than defaulting on debt.
If: Lf (d1, H∗, i∗(pe), x˜)− Ld(d1, H∗, i∗(pe), x˜) > 0, the government’s best response is to default.
As the endogenous aggregate outcome of investors’ individual optimal decisions H∗ and i∗(pe) af-
fect the government’s decision, multiple equilibria may arise in the model depending on investors’
expectations if, and only if, distinct expectations are validated in equilibrium for the same d1. Indeed,
distinct expected probabilities of default lead to distinct individual decisions and thus to distinct ag-
gregate outcomes, which in turn affect the ex ante probability of default. In particular, for a given d1,
if investors expect the probability of default to be null (pe = 0), this yields H∗ = 12 and i
∗(0) = rf .
These beliefs hold in equilibrium if, and only if, forH∗ = 12 and i
∗(0) = rf , it is indeed optimal for the
government not to default, whatever the realization of the shock (that is, if and only if, p(d1, 12 , 0) = 0).
If investors expect the probability of default to be 1, demand for domestic sovereign bonds is null and
this pushes the government into a roll-over crisis in period 1. These beliefs are validated for all values
of d1. Eventually, if creditors expect the probability of default to be 0 < pe < 1, this yields H∗ > 12
and i∗(pe) > rf .23 Therefore, this gives rise possibly to an infinity of equilibria for a given d1, due to
the continuum of shocks. Which equilibria arise for a given d1 depends on the value of d1 and on the
government’s loss functions. We now assess the impact of more pessimistic expectations and higher
debt level on the model’s equilibrium to replicate the increase in home bias and assess its potential
consequences for sovereign debt crisis.
3.3 Change in equilibrium following an exogenous change in expectations
We consider an initial equilibrium and we assess the consequences on the creditors and the govern-
ment’s decisions of an exogenous change in expectations based on our prior empirical results.
Shift in investors’ decision We first assess the conditions under which expectations becoming
suddenly more pessimistic cause home bias in sovereign debt to increase for a given debt fundamen-
tal. We thus consider the impact of an exogenous marginal increase in the expected probability of
default. Two cases allow to replicate the increase in home bias associated with an increasing market
return on sovereign debt.
23Indeed, as pe 6= 0, ωD[i∗(pe), pe]− ω∗F [i∗(pe), pe] = (iD [i
∗(pe),pe]−iF [i∗(pe),pe])pe(1+rf )
(iD [i
∗(pe),pe]−rf )(iF [i∗(pe),pe]−rf ) > 0. As risk of default
is then expected to be non-null, investors accept to buy the debt stock d1 if and only if i∗(pe) > rf . It is indeed
assumed that domestic post-consumption wealth W1−C∗1 is lower than the exogenous debt supply d1, such that
domestic creditors cannot buy all the debt stock.
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First, if expectations switch from an expected null probability of default to an expected probability
of default of 0 < pe
2
< 1, home bias increases, as it goes from H∗
1
= 12 to H
∗2 > 12 and so does
the equilibrium return on sovereign debt, as it goes from i∗(0) = rf to i∗(pe
2
) > rf . In this case,
the increase in home bias is explained by the fact that creditors no longer expect the probability of a
sovereign default to be null, which makes foreign and domestic demand for domestic debt securities
no longer equal, due to diverging expected implicit returns when the probability of default differs
from 0. Domestic demand thus becomes higher than foreign demand for any return i, and in particu-
lar in equilibrium, as shown above, which ensures that H∗ > 12 . However, this case arises for a given
fiscal fundamental d1 if and only if the expectation shock, which makes the expected probability of
default go from 0 to 0 < pe
2
< 1, is in fine validated following the endogenous change in aggregate
decisions i∗(pe
2
) and H∗, that is if and only if p(d1, H∗
2
, i∗(pe
2
)) = pe
2
> 0 prior to the macroeco-
nomic shock. Homogenous individual expectations are validated through their impact on aggregate
decisions and thus on the government’s decision. The endogenous increase in i∗(pe) following the
expectation shock causes the probability of default to rise, whereas the increase in H∗ makes it de-
crease. Therefore, more pessimistic expectations are validated if and only if the positive impact of a
higher i∗(pe) on the probability of default dominates that of a higher H∗.
Second, if the expected probability of default marginally increases from 0 < pe
1
< 1 to an expected
probability of default of 0 < pe
2
< 1 for a given d1, plausible conditions allow to replicate the increase
in home bias associated with an increase in the market interest rate in equilibrium.
The market rate increases following a pessimistic expectations shock due to a decrease in total de-
mand for sovereign bonds. Indeed, for a given i and a given 0 < pe < 1, foreign demand writes:
ωF [i, p
e] =
iF (i, p
e)− rf − pe(1 + iF (i, pe))
iF (i, pe)− rf .
Therefore,
∂ωF
∂pe
=
(rf − iF (i, pe))(1 + iF (i, pe)) + pe(1 + rf )∂iF∂pe (i, pe)
(iF (i, pe)− rf )2 < 0.
as ∂iF∂pe (i, p
e) < 0. Similarly,
∂ωD
∂pe
=
(rf − iD(i, pe))(1 + iD(i, pe)) + pe(1 + rf )∂iD∂pe (i, pe)
(iD(i, pe)− rf )2 .
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As the negative risk effect of an increasing expected probability of default on demand is assumed to
dominate the positive return effect (due to higher additional benefits), that is:
| (rf − iD(i, pe))(1 + iD(i, pe)) |> pe(1 + rf )∂iD
∂pe
(i, pe),
domestic demand also decreases in the expected probability of default for a given i. Therefore, the
market clearing interest rate i∗(pe) increases.24
As for the equilibrium home bias, according to the first order conditions, it writes:
H∗ =
(ωD[i
∗(pe), pe])W1
d1(1 + β)
=
iD(i
∗(pe), pe)− rf − pe(1 + iD(i∗(pe), pe))
iD(i∗(pe), pe)− rf
W1
d1(1 + β)
.
Therefore, a sufficient and necessary condition such that home bias rises following a marginal increase
in the expected probability of default (obtained by differentiation with respect to pe) is thus:
s[i∗(pe), pe] ≥ iD(i
∗(pe), pe)(iD[i∗(pe), pe]− rf + 1)
pe(1 + rf )
,
with
s[i∗(pe), pe] = i∗
′
(p)
∂iD
∂i
(i∗(pe), pe) +
∂iD
∂pe
(i∗(pe), pe) > 0. (1)
This term captures the variation in the expected implicit domestic return following the increase in
the expected probability of default. It is positive as for domestic investors, an increased expected
probability of default increases the implicit return due to both a return effect (represented by the
term i∗
′
(p)∂iD∂i (i
∗(pe), pe) > 0) and a risk effect (represented by the term ∂iD∂pe (i
∗(pe), pe)) > 0): the
higher equilibrium interest rate increases the implicit equilibrium return but the higher expected de-
fault probability also raises it, as it provides more incentives to invest in domestic debt for domestic
creditors, as justified above. By contrast, for foreign investors, the return effect affects positively
the foreign implicit return but the risk effect has a negative impact on the foreign implicit return (as
∂iF
∂pe (i
∗(pe), pe) < 0).
Interpretation: Condition (1) can be given the following economic interpretation. The equilibrium
share of domestic debt held at home increases following a marginal increase in the probability of
24Indeed, debt supply remains constant at d1 while total demand decreases for a given i, as both domestic and
foreign demand decrease. Thus, the market clearing condition imposes: QT (i∗(pe), pe) = d1 = QT (i∗(pe
2
), pe
2
).
As ∂QT
∂i
(i) and QT (i∗(pe), pe) > QT (i∗(pe), pe
2
) due to increased risk and constant implicit return, if i∗(pe) >
i∗(pe
2
): d1 = QT (i∗(pe), pe) > QT (i∗(pe), pe
2
) > QT (i
∗(pe
2
), pe
2
) = d1, which is absurd. Therefore, i∗(pe) <
i∗(pe
2
). This is illustrated on Figure 7 below.
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default from pe
1
to pe
2
if and only if the increase in the equilibrium domestic implicit return is high
enough relative to a quantity which decreases in the return on the risk-free asset and which increases
in the implicit return on sovereign debt. Therefore, this condition is less restrictive when the ex-
ogenous risk-free return is higher, due to the fact that a similar riskless gain on savings can then be
achieved by investing a lower share of post-consumption wealth in the risk-free asset. By contrast,
this condition is more restrictive when the initial implicit domestic return on sovereign debt securi-
ties is higher. This relates to the fact that a similar expected gain can then be achieved on savings by
taking less risk (that is, by investing a lower share of wealth in the risky asset).
If we denote by z[i∗(pe), pe] the term which captures the variation in the expected implicit expected
return following the increase in the expected probability of default, as market still clears for the same
debt supply level d1, Condition (1) mechanically implies that:
z[i∗(pe), pe] ≤ iF [i
∗(pe), pe](iF [i∗(pe), pe]− rf + 1)
pe(1 + rf )
,
which is less restrictive when the risk-free rate is lower and the initial implicit foreign return on
sovereign debt securities is higher.
The necessary and sufficient Condition (1) is plausible as s[i∗(pe), pe] ≥ z[i∗(pe), pe] due to the neg-
ative risk impact on return for foreigners. Once again, this case arises if and only if, for a given
d1, p(d1, H2∗, i∗(pe
2
)) = pe
2
> pe
1
, such that the initially more pessimistic expectations are indeed
validated in equilibrium. The mechanism behind such results is a self-fulfilling mechanism: if all
creditors suddenly expect the probability of default to be higher for a given amount of government’s
indebtedness, this will indeed lead the probability of default to increase, as the higher i∗(pe) effec-
tively raises the debt service. This mechanism arises due to the existence of strategic complementar-
ities which make higher order beliefs matter: if an individual creditor believes the other creditors to
believe that the probability of default is higher, it is optimal for him to act as he expects the other
creditors to act, as these latter’s aggregate decision impacts the government’s decision.
Figure 7 provides a graphical example.
To sum-up, we identified a sufficient and necessary condition such that the model replicates the em-
pirical result: more pessimistic expectations lead to higher market interest rate and home bias.
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Figure 7: Endogenous home bias
Change in the government’s decision We now assess the impact of the change in investors’ op-
timal decision on the government’s best response due to exogenously more pessimistic expectations
triggering an increase in the market interest rate and in home bias in sovereign debt, in order to fully
characterize the new subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1: When the expected probability of default increases marginally, a switch from the gov-
ernment non-default equilibrium to the default equilibrium occurs if and only if:
Lf (d1, H
∗1 , i∗(pe
1
), x˜)− Ld(d1, H∗1 , i∗(pe1), x˜) < 0
and Lf (d1, H∗
2
, i∗(pe
2
)), x˜)− Ld(d1, H∗2 , i∗(pe2), x˜) > 0 (2).
The distinct effects at work are the following. On the one hand, in the situation with more pessimistic
expectations, the market interest rate i∗(pe) is higher, which makes the probability of default increase.
This leads to a destabilizing effect of the change in expectations. On the other hand, the increase in
home bias in equilibrium H∗ following the change in expectations causes a decrease in the incentives
to default.
All in all, whether this leads to a switch in the government’s decision depends on the value of d1,
on the shapes of the government’s loss functions (which capture the relative effect of a destabilizing
change in expectations and a stabilizing increase in home bias) and on the realization of the macroe-
conomic shock. The necessary and sufficient Condition (2) is satisfied if and only if the impact of the
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increase in the market interest rate i∗(pe) on the probability of default is strong enough relative to that
of the increase in the equilibrium home bias H∗ and the realization of the worldwide shock x˜ is low
enough.
3.4 Change in equilibrium following exogenous changes in the expectations and
in the fiscal fundamental
We consider an initial equilibrium and we assess the consequences on the creditors and the govern-
ment’s decisions of an exogenous change in the fiscal fundamental,25 based on our prior empirical
results, in order to show how these exogenous variations can cause home bias in sovereign debt to
increase.
Shift in investors’ decision We assess the impact of a marginal increase in the debt stock d1 on the
model’s equilibrium. A marginal increase in d1 raises the probability of default per se, as it increases
the amount to be repaid. However, this also causes the market interest rate and the equilibrium
home bias to vary (both through the effect of the new probability of default and of the new supply
of debt which affects the market clearing equilibrium), which also impact in turn the probability of
default. Therefore, starting from an initial equilibrium with expected probability of default pe(d1),
the expected probability of default endogenously switches to pe(d′1), capturing both the impact of the
exogenous change in d1 and of the endogenous change in i∗(pe(d1)) and H∗(d1).26
The new equilibrium home bias H∗(d′1) writes:
H∗(d′1) =
(ωD[i
∗(pe(d′1), d
′
1), p
e(d′1)])W1
d′1(1 + β)
.
Therefore, a necessary and sufficient condition for home bias to be higher in the new equilibrium is:
v[i∗(pe(d1), d1), pe(d1)] ≥ iD[i
∗(pe(d1),d1),pe(d1)](iD[i∗(pe(d1),d1),pe(d1)]−rf+1)
p∗(1+rf )
d′1
d1
, (3)
with d
′
1
d1
→ 1. The quantity v[i∗(pe(d1), d1), pe(d1)] captures the impact of a marginal increase in d1 on
25We focus on the impact of a change in the fiscal fundamental, that is in the debt. However, the reasoning
would be perfectly similar for an exogenous change in the growth rate, which could also be introduced as a
variable in the probability of default function. The necessary and sufficient condition such that an increase in
home bias associated with an increase in the interest rate is replicated following an exogenous change in the
growth rate would be exactly the same as that following an exogenous change in the fiscal fundamental, except
that the debt would be set constant.
26Contrary to the previous case in which debt d1 was set constant, we now make clear which variables depend
on d1.
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the implicit domestic return on sovereign debt securities. It is equal to:
∂iD
∂i
[i∗(pe(d1), d1), pe(d1)]
(
∂i∗
∂pe
[
i∗(pe(d1), d1), pe(d1)
]
(pe)′(d1) +
∂i∗
∂d1
[
i∗(pe(d1), d1), pe(d1)
])
+
∂iD
∂pe
[
i∗(pe(d1), d1), pe(d1)
]
(pe)′(d1).
This term captures first the impact of a higher debt stock d1 on the implicit return through its overall
impact on the market interest rate:
∂iD
∂i
[
i∗(pe(d1), d1), pe(d1)
]( ∂i∗
∂pe
[
i∗(pe(d1), d1), pe(d1)
]
(pe)′(d1) +
∂i∗
∂d1
[
i∗(pe(d1), d1), pe(d1)
])
.
It depends on the impact of a higher interest rate on the implicit domestic return
∂iD
∂i [i
∗(pe(d1), d1), pe(d1)] > 0, on the impact of a higher expected probability of default on the market
interest rate ∂i
∗
∂pe [i
∗(pe(d1), d1), pe(d1)] > 0, on the impact of a higher debt level on the expected prob-
ability of default (pe)′(d1) which sign is ambiguous, and on the impact of a higher debt level on the
market interest rate ∂i
∗
∂d1
[i∗(pe(d1), d1), pe(d1)]) > 0.
Second, it captures the impact of a marginal increase in debt on the implicit domestic return through
its impact on the expected probability of default
∂iD
∂pe [i
∗(pe(d1), d1), pe(d1)](pe)′(d1), with ∂iD∂pe [i
∗(pe(d1), d1), pe(d1)] > 0.
Once again, Condition (3) is less restrictive when the risk-free rate rf is higher and when the initial
domestic implicit return on sovereign debt is lower. Obviously, a sufficient condition for i∗(pe(d1), d1)
to increase as well following a marginal increase in the debt is that total demand decreases for a given
i (which is satisfied as soon as pe(d1) < pe(d′1)).27 Figure 8 provides a graphical example.28 Therefore,
the debt crisis model enables to identify conditions under which a marginal change in debt triggers
a simultaneous increase in home bias in sovereign debt and in the nominal return on sovereign debt.
We now assess the impact of this shift on the government’s decision of default. We show that this
impact depends on the initial causes of the increase in home bias, which reveals that it matters to
identify them for assessing the consequences for sovereign debt crisis, in particular in the case of do-
mestic shocks.
27 Indeed, in this case, we have ∂QT
∂i
[i, pe(d1)] > 0 and QT [i∗(pe(d1), d1), pe(d1)] > QT [i∗(pe(d1), d1), pe(d′1)].
Therefore, if i∗(pe(d1), d1) > i∗(pe(d′1), d′1): d1 = QT [i∗(pe(d1), d1), pe(d1)] > QT [i∗(pe(d1), d1), pe(d′1)] >
QT [i
∗(pe(d′1), d
′
1), p
e(d′1)] = d
′
1, which is absurd.
28In order to make the chart clearer, we figure an increase in d1 which is not a marginal increase strictly
speaking.
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Figure 8: Higher fiscal fundamental
Change in the government’s decision We assess the impact of the change in investors’ optimal
decision on the government’s best response due to exogenously worst fiscal fundamental triggering
an increase in the market interest rate and in home bias in sovereign debt, in order to fully character-
ize the new subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2: When the fiscal fundamental increases marginally, a switch from the non-default equi-
librium to the default equilibrium occurs if and only if:
Lf (d1, H
∗(d1), i∗(pe(d1), d1), x˜)− Ld(d1, H∗(d1, i∗(pe(d1), d1), x˜) < 0
and Lf (d′1, H∗(d′1), i∗(pe(d′1), d′1), x˜)− Ld(d′1, H∗(d′1), i∗(pe(d′1), d′1), x˜) > 0 (4).
On the one hand, the increase in the fiscal fundamental raises the probability of default. It also causes
the market interest rate to increase, which further raises the probability of default. On the other hand,
the increase in home bias that it triggers partly contains this rise. Condition (4) provides a necessary
and sufficient condition such that a switch in the government’s best response occurs in the case of the
fiscal fundamental shock. It is satisfied when the size of the positive impact of the marginal increase
in debt and of the endogenous increase in the market interest rate on the probability of default is high
enough relative to that (negative) of the endogenous increase in home bias and if the realization of
the macroeconomic shock x˜ is low enough.
Therefore, an increase in home bias reflects the existence of an exogenous source of fragility that can
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lead to a switch in the government’s decision, but this is not an ex post additional source of fragility
itself. On the reverse, it plays a stabilizing role – notably through political costs – that mitigates the
effect of the ex ante source of fragility that triggered it, and makes the condition for a switch in the
government’s decision towards default less likely. We have identified and interpreted a sufficient
condition, both in the case of a change in expectations and a change in the fiscal fundamental, such
that the situation that triggers an increase in home bias ends up in sovereign default. Nevertheless,
if this condition is not satisfied, defaulting remains suboptimal for the government, either because
home bias increases enough to partly counterbalance the deteriorating macroeconomic conditions or
because the deterioration in those conditions is not sufficient to alleviate the government’s cost of
default.
4 Conclusion
Empirical investigation reveals that, as expected, domestic shocks related to countries’ fiscal sustain-
ability significantly affect the dynamics of home bias in sovereign debt holdings in the Euro area. The
impact of fundamental shocks appears to be the most robust one, as it holds both in all panel tests and
all country-specific tests. However, country-specific expectations shocks prove to have a significant
impact on home bias in several GIIPS countries, those which were actually identified as prone to self-
fulfilling market sentiment. In addition, we relativize the view held in the theoretical literature that
an increase in home bias is destabilizing per se through its impact on the growth rate. These results
are robust to alternative identification strategies.
A simple model of sovereign debt crisis shedding light on the cost of default and providing micro-
foundations for investors’ decision allows us to provide a theoretical explanation to the transmission
of exogenous changes in domestic variables to the share of debt held by domestic creditors in ac-
cordance with the literature, and to investigate the potential overall consequences of an increase in
this share when it is driven by a sudden worsening in the sovereign debt situation. We show that
whether a sovereign default becomes optimal for the government following this worsening depends
on the relative effects of the increase in home bias and of the source of fragility that triggered it.
If the increase in home bias is sufficiently high compared to the worsening in fundamentals and in
expectations, it may act as a counteracting mechanism, which can ultimately prevent default. How-
ever, if such increase can ease fiscal stress in the short term, it does not in itself preclude the need
for policy measures aimed at containing the worsening in fiscal conditions in the longer run. The de-
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crease in home bias in sovereign debt that was observed in most Euro area countries in the first half of
2015 suggests that ECB injection liquidity measures have proven successful in restoring confidence,
inducing foreign investors to return to Eurozone sovereign debt markets.
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A Data on home bias in sovereign debt
Country Data Valuation Source
France Debt Securities Market Value Bank of France
Germany Debt Liabilities Nominal Value Deutsche Bundesbank
Greece Debt Securities Market Value Bank of Greece
Ireland Long-Term Bonds Nominal Value Central Bank of Ireland
Italy Debt Securities Nominal Value Bank of Italy
Portugal Debt Securities Nominal Value Bank of Portugal
Spain Debt Securities Market Value Bank of Spain
B Impulse response functions
Figure 9: Impulse response functions – Whole sample over the period 2002-2007
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Figure 10: Impulse response functions – Whole sample over the period 2008-2014
Figure 11: Impulse response functions – Panel of 4 countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain)
Figure 12: Impulse response functions – Ireland
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Figure 13: Impulse response functions – Italy
Figure 14: Impulse response functions – Spain
Figure 15: Impulse response functions – Portugal
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Figure 16: Impulse response functions – First Cholesky decomposition
Figure 17: Impulse response functions – Second Cholesky decomposition
Figure 18: Impulse response functions – Third Cholesky decomposition
41
C Forecast Error Variance Decompositions
Vix shock (%) hb spread debt gdp Spread shock (%) hb debt gdp vix
1 0.35 0.28 0.00 0.00 1 3.58 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 1.82 0.35 0.62 7.06 2 3.46 0.02 0.30 0.02
3 3.32 0.50 1.77 9.13 3 3.36 0.07 0.60 0.06
4 4.65 0.63 2.93 9.87 4 3.24 0.17 0.91 0.11
8 8.22 0.92 5.86 10.09 8 3.11 1.01 2.08 0.36
12 10.06 0.99 6.91 9.92 12 3.09 2.53 2.97 0.54
Debt shock (%) hb spread gdp vix Hb shock (%) spread debt gdp vix
1 11.64 8.06 4.49 0.00 1 3.76 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 13.00 7.83 4.16 0.04 2 3.67 0.04 0.12 0.01
3 14.37 7.88 4.10 0.12 3 3.64 0.13 0.25 0.02
4 15.73 8.04 4.10 0.25 4 3.60 0.29 0.38 0.04
8 21.05 9.04 4.45 1.01 8 3.76 1.45 0.89 0.13
12 26.18 10.38 5.02 1.84 12 4.08 3.38 1.33 0.20
Gdp shock (%) hb spread debt vix
1 2.15 1.53 4.50 0.00
2 2.01 3.98 5.55 0.35
3 2.05 4.69 5.97 0.43
4 2.12 5.05 6.24 0.46
8 2.46 5.39 6.89 0.58
12 2.89 5.26 7.22 0.70
Table 1: Variance decomposition – Whole sample
Vix shock (%) hb spread debt gdp Spread shock (%) hb debt gdp vix
1 0.78 0.58 0.00 0.00 1 3.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.88 1.91 0.13 0.28 2 3.48 0.03 0.92 0.44
3 1.11 3.72 0.32 0.31 3 4.00 0.10 1.28 1.33
4 1.29 5.40 0.53 0.35 4 4.65 0.19 1.71 2.51
8 1.69 9.96 1.17 0.56 8 8.09 0.74 2.75 7.51
12 2.00 11.45 1.54 0.72 12 11.85 1.39 3.23 10.59
Debt shock (%) hb spread gdp vix Hb shock (%) spread debt gdp vix
1 15.94 2.02 4.13 0.00 1 3.83 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 15.55 2.18 4.27 0.23 2 3.81 0.03 0.10 0.16
3 15.45 2.43 4.42 0.69 3 3.82 0.10 0.15 0.47
4 15.26 2.72 4.54 1.27 4 3.81 0.20 0.20 0.87
8 14.43 4.56 4.96 3.59 8 4.29 0.76 0.34 2.43
12 13.82 6.71 5.33 4.86 12 5.16 1.43 0.45 3.31
Gdp shock (%) hb spread debt vix
1 1.03 0.55 4.01 0.00
2 3.00 0.93 4.39 0.35
3 2.96 0.89 4.33 0.44
4 3.08 0.90 4.32 0.57
8 3.14 1.01 4.21 0.94
12 3.13 1.19 4.06 1.11
Table 2: Variance decomposition – Whole sample 2002-2007
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Vix shock (%) hb spread debt gdp Spread shock (%) hb debt gdp vix
1 0.65 0.42 0.00 0.00 1 3.87 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 1.03 1.11 0.15 6.30 2 3.86 0.45 0.70 0.05
3 1.21 1.74 0.29 7.71 3 3.88 1.48 1.46 0.13
4 1.33 2.26 0.43 8.05 4 4.00 2.98 2.18 0.21
8 1.69 3.30 0.98 8.11 8 4.95 11.72 4.27 0.55
12 1.99 3.52 1.44 8.01 12 6.79 20.88 5.51 1.26
Debt shock (%) hb spread gdp vix Hb shock (%) spread debt gdp vix
1 0.78 3.47 4.09 0.00 1 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 1.05 2.48 3.87 0.43 2 3.94 0.04 0.04 0.08
3 1.40 2.01 3.89 1.16 3 3.90 0.12 0.10 0.21
4 1.75 1.94 3.98 1.97 4 3.88 0.25 0.16 0.36
8 3.45 2.59 4.35 4.69 8 4.20 1.14 0.43 0.81
12 5.29 3.56 4.59 6.31 12 4.80 2.43 0.70 1.05
Gdp shock (%) hb spread debt vix
1 4.84 1.04 4.01 0.00
2 4.63 2.44 4.51 1.39
3 4.74 3.22 4.68 1.57
4 4.95 3.72 4.81 1.63
8 5.76 4.54 5.10 2.06
12 6.42 4.72 5.09 2.45
Table 3: Variance decomposition – Whole sample 2008-2014
Vix shock (%) hb spread debt gdp Spread shock (%) hb debt gdp vix
1 0.72 0.25 0.00 0.00 1 3.59 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 2.96 0.57 0.62 7.06 2 3.54 0.02 0.21 0.02
3 5.00 1.09 1.65 8.74 3 3.47 0.06 0.37 0.05
4 6.73 1.60 2.60 9.37 4 3.51 0.12 0.54 0.10
8 10.20 2.63 4.60 9.51 8 3.97 0.54 1.20 0.30
12 11.09 2.66 4.91 9.37 12 4.62 1.22 1.79 0.45
Debt shock (%) hb spread gdp vix Hb shock (%) spread debt gdp vix
1 12.46 10.39 4.88 0.00 1 3.69 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 14.46 9.90 4.52 0.03 2 3.60 0.09 0.30 0.01
3 16.42 9.77 4.43 0.10 3 3.62 0.32 0.57 0.05
4 18.42 9.78 4.44 0.19 4 3.70 0.67 0.85 0.09
8 26.27 10.47 4.72 0.74 8 4.44 3.15 1.89 0.27
12 33.53 11.86 5.30 1.43 12 5.49 6.86 2.64 0.37
Gdp shock (%) hb spread debt vix
1 2.59 2.17 4.62 0.00
2 2.46 5.09 5.23 0.31
3 2.43 5.74 5.31 0.36
4 2.44 6.06 5.33 0.39
8 2.59 6.08 5.41 0.54
12 2.79 5.66 5.31 0.67
Table 4: Variance decomposition – Panel of 4 countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain)
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Vix shock (%) hb spread debt gdp Spread shock (%) hb debt gdp vix
1 0.49 0.61 0.00 0.00 1 2.82 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 1.15 0.63 0.33 0.07 2 2.78 0.07 0.03 0.02
3 2.06 0.73 0.96 0.07 3 2.77 0.20 0.03 0.07
4 3.06 0.86 1.74 0.09 4 2.76 0.40 0.05 0.15
8 7.09 1.38 5.13 0.11 8 2.93 1.52 0.08 0.69
12 10.46 1.87 7.68 0.13 12 3.34 2.94 0.11 1.47
Debt shock (%) hb spread gdp vix Hb shock (%) spread debt gdp vix
1 29.26 0.40 4.03 0.00 1 4.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 30.02 0.43 4.03 0.01 2 4.17 0.01 0.01 0.01
3 30.73 0.44 4.03 0.03 3 4.29 0.03 0.01 0.03
4 31.33 0.46 4.03 0.05 4 4.44 0.07 0.01 0.05
8 33.27 0.66 4.04 0.22 8 5.17 0.28 0.02 0.27
12 34.93 1.04 4.05 0.53 12 6.26 0.58 0.03 0.58
Gdp shock (%) hb spread debt vix
1 1.61 0.38 4.29 0.00
2 2.35 0.84 4.83 0.13
3 2.26 0.74 4.66 0.12
4 2.31 0.74 4.59 0.13
8 2.32 0.68 4.17 0.16
12 2.33 0.67 3.88 0.22
Table 5: Variance decomposition – Ireland
Vix shock (%) hb spread debt gdp Spread shock (%) hb debt gdp vix
1 0.48 0.76 0.00 0.00 1 4.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.68 0.87 0.10 2.18 2 4.32 0.03 0.09 0.03
3 0.85 0.98 0.39 3.13 3 5.06 0.10 0.16 0.12
4 1.00 1.09 0.80 3.90 4 6.09 0.22 0.25 0.26
8 1.51 1.59 2.84 5.36 8 14.40 1.15 0.68 1.18
12 1.91 2.05 4.73 5.80 12 27.30 2.67 1.13 2.33
Debt shock (%) hb spread gdp vix Hb shock (%) spread debt gdp vix
1 0.40 0.41 4.12 0.00 1 4.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.52 0.47 4.02 0.05 2 4.06 0.00 0.01 0.01
3 0.57 0.48 3.98 0.06 3 4.09 0.02 0.02 0.03
4 0.64 0.50 3.96 0.07 4 4.16 0.03 0.03 0.06
8 1.15 0.60 3.88 0.16 8 4.60 0.16 0.08 0.32
12 1.79 0.80 3.85 0.29 12 5.27 0.37 0.16 0.71
Gdp shock (%) hb spread debt vix
1 0.71 0.63 4.14 0.00
2 2.34 1.84 5.07 1.38
3 2.37 2.04 5.10 1.47
4 2.31 2.22 5.08 1.51
8 1.80 2.64 4.90 1.43
12 1.60 2.94 4.63 1.45
Table 6: Variance decomposition – Italy
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Vix shock (%) hb spread debt gdp Spread shock (%) hb debt gdp vix
1 3.04 0.40 0.00 0.00 1 3.77 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 3.01 0.55 1.17 2.94 2 3.85 0.01 0.05 0.04
3 2.87 0.81 3.36 3.84 3 4.06 0.04 0.10 0.14
4 2.80 1.11 6.06 4.66 4 4.38 0.09 0.16 0.28
8 2.97 2.52 16.74 5.83 8 6.85 0.45 0.43 1.18
12 3.44 3.88 23.72 6.03 12 11.27 1.02 0.70 2.19
Debt shock (%) hb spread gdp vix Hb shock (%) spread debt gdp vix
1 2.12 0.38 4.13 0.00 1 3.96 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 2.09 0.42 4.00 0.03 2 4.07 0.03 0.03 0.08
3 2.03 0.45 3.96 0.06 3 4.28 0.12 0.06 0.27
4 1.96 0.50 3.92 0.09 4 4.58 0.28 0.10 0.56
8 1.67 0.75 3.87 0.30 8 6.23 1.57 0.38 2.57
12 1.45 1.10 3.87 0.58 12 8.30 3.77 0.77 5.12
Gdp shock (%) hb spread debt vix
1 0.44 0.40 4.16 0.00
2 0.96 0.68 4.29 0.78
3 0.91 0.65 4.19 0.78
4 0.90 0.67 4.06 0.80
8 0.87 0.74 3.53 0.79
12 0.86 0.82 3.06 0.86
Table 7: Variance decomposition – Spain
Vix shock (%) hb spread debt gdp Spread shock (%) hb debt gdp vix
1 0.75 0.67 0.00 0.00 1 4.47 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 2.50 1.21 0.13 0.58 2 5.82 0.05 0.04 0.02
3 4.69 1.75 0.34 0.66 3 8.23 0.18 0.05 0.07
4 6.69 2.26 0.58 0.76 4 11.61 0.39 0.07 0.13
8 10.16 3.57 1.53 0.87 8 26.08 2.38 0.15 0.51
12 9.71 4.19 2.42 0.93 12 34.99 6.32 0.23 1.01
Debt shock (%) hb spread gdp vix Hb shock (%) spread debt gdp vix
1 0.72 2.80 4.32 0.00 1 4.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 1.66 3.13 4.41 0.10 2 4.02 0.11 0.06 0.05
3 3.30 3.37 4.44 0.25 3 3.98 0.33 0.08 0.14
4 5.55 3.59 4.48 0.42 4 4.03 0.61 0.10 0.25
8 14.52 4.10 4.59 1.15 8 4.38 1.86 0.15 0.68
12 19.40 4.33 4.65 1.80 12 4.87 2.79 0.18 0.96
Gdp shock (%) hb spread debt vix
1 0.88 1.05 4.53 0.00
2 1.49 1.90 5.26 0.78
3 1.45 1.83 5.13 0.79
4 1.55 1.84 5.07 0.85
8 1.89 1.82 4.77 1.00
12 2.08 1.82 4.48 1.13
Table 8: Variance decomposition – Portugal
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Vix shock (%) hb spread debt gdp Spread shock (%) hb debt gdp vix
1 0.33 0.28 0.00 0.00 1 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 1.67 0.35 0.61 6.87 2 0.23 0.02 0.31 0.02
3 3.05 0.51 1.72 8.87 3 0.25 0.07 0.62 0.06
4 4.30 0.64 2.81 9.60 4 0.28 0.17 0.94 0.11
8 7.59 0.94 5.57 9.78 8 0.45 0.98 2.12 0.38
12 9.22 1.00 6.51 9.60 12 0.66 2.42 3.02 0.55
Debt shock (%) hb spread gdp vix Hb shock (%) spread debt gdp vix
1 13.50 7.84 5.64 0.54 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 15.18 6.97 5.25 0.52 2 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.01
3 16.87 6.77 5.11 0.54 3 0.03 0.14 0.26 0.02
4 18.53 6.72 5.06 0.66 4 0.07 0.31 0.40 0.04
8 24.87 7.43 5.25 1.56 8 0.35 1.55 0.95 0.12
12 30.71 8.71 5.75 2.51 12 0.75 3.59 1.42 0.18
Gdp shock (%) hb spread debt vix
1 1.16 2.30 0.00 2.88
2 1.21 5.38 0.78 4.37
3 1.31 6.47 1.28 4.71
4 1.42 7.07 1.68 4.83
8 1.76 7.85 2.78 4.90
12 2.00 7.76 3.49 4.84
Table 9: Variance decomposition – Whole sample, first Cholesky decomposition
Vix shock (%) hb spread debt gdp Spread shock (%) hb debt gdp vix
1 0.34 0.29 0.00 0.00 1 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 1.71 0.36 0.60 6.97 2 0.22 0.02 0.32 0.02
3 3.11 0.50 1.69 9.00 3 0.24 0.07 0.62 0.06
4 4.36 0.63 2.79 9.72 4 0.27 0.17 0.94 0.12
8 7.66 0.91 5.53 9.93 8 0.46 0.98 2.14 0.38
12 9.34 0.97 6.41 9.74 12 0.67 2.45 3.03 0.55
Debt shock (%) hb spread gdp vix Hb shock (%) spread debt gdp vix
1 11.09 9.53 0.00 0.24 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 12.60 9.53 0.02 0.26 2 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.01
3 14.02 9.67 0.05 0.38 3 0.03 0.14 0.26 0.02
4 15.40 9.85 0.11 0.54 4 0.07 0.31 0.40 0.04
8 20.60 10.94 0.47 1.42 8 0.35 1.54 0.96 0.12
12 25.51 12.47 1.00 2.31 12 0.76 3.59 1.43 0.17
Gdp shock (%) hb spread debt vix
1 3.78 0.67 5.75 3.19
2 3.97 2.82 9.36 4.65
3 4.39 3.56 10.9 74.91
4 4.77 3.96 12.0 44.95
8 6.18 4.32 14.3 34.91
12 7.32 4.11 15.2 14.92
Table 10: Variance decomposition – Whole sample, second Cholesky decomposition
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Vix shock (%) hb spread debt gdp Spread shock (%) hb debt gdp vix
1 0.33 0.29 0.00 96.20 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 1.72 0.36 6.90 94.67 2 0.02 0.02 0.33 0.02
3 3.12 0.50 8.93 94.26 3 0.05 0.08 0.65 0.06
4 4.38 0.64 9.65 93.88 4 0.09 0.18 0.99 0.12
8 7.67 0.90 9.84 92.35 8 0.28 1.08 2.24 0.39
12 9.31 0.96 9.67 90.95 12 0.50 2.69 3.20 0.58
Debt shock (%) hb spread gdp vix Hb shock (%) spread debt gdp vix
1 13.85 7.63 5.72 0.52 1 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 15.56 6.82 5.31 0.51 2 0.25 0.04 0.11 0.01
3 17.25 6.62 5.16 0.54 3 0.25 0.13 0.23 0.02
4 18.93 6.58 5.12 0.66 4 0.27 0.29 0.35 0.03
8 25.20 7.34 5.32 1.55 8 0.49 1.45 0.84 0.11
12 31.05 8.70 5.80 2.50 12 0.76 3.37 1.25 0.16
Gdp shock (%) hb spread debt vix
1 1.21 2.31 0.00 2.79
2 1.24 5.31 0.77 4.30
3 1.34 6.37 1.26 4.65
4 1.46 6.95 1.66 4.79
8 1.82 7.74 2.74 4.84
12 2.04 7.65 3.45 4.80
Table 11: Variance decomposition – Whole sample, third Cholesky decomposition
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